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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 35 and the request of the Clerk,
Hercules, Inc. submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant's Petition for Rehearing.
ARGUMENT
The relevant statute in effect when Wagner initiated
this action in 1986 did not authorize an award of attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party.

In 1989, during the pendency of this

case, the statute was amended to include a provision for awarding
attorneys' fees.

To apply the amendment retroactively against

Hercules would be unfair and inconsistent with policies articulated by the courts of Utah and of neighboring jurisdictions.
The amendment is substantive in nature because it creates new
rights and liabilities and it changes the measure of damages.
Substantive changes in statutes which occur during the pendency
of an action are not given retroactive effect.
Furthermore, there is no reason to award attorneys'
fees to Wagner in this action.

Hercules defended at trial in

good faith and made no counterclaims.
allegation

that Hercules

engaged

oppressive conduct.

-1-

There is no evidence or

in frivolous, vexatious or

I.

THE ATTORNEYS1 FEES PROVISION IS A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
In Utah, "[attorney's fees are chargeable to an oppos-

ing party only if there is a contractual or statutory liability
therefor."

Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977).X

Contractual liability for attorneys' fees is not at issue in this
action; the only issue is whether there is statutory liability.
Wagner initiated this action on January 16f 1986, when
the relevant statute did not authorize an award of attorneys'
fees.

Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-3 (1953 as enacted 1963).

During

the pendency of this case, S 14-2-3 was repealed in 1987, and
then in 1989, S 14-2-2 was amended to include a provision for
awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
S 14-2-2(3) (as amended 1989).

Utah Code Ann.

The issue which this Court has

raised through its opinion and rehearing order is whether the
amended statute should be given retroactive effect to permit an
award of attorneys' fees.

Utah law, as well as persuasive

authority from other jurisdictions, counsels that S 14-2-2(3)
should not be applied retroactively.
Although S 14-2-2 is silent regarding its application
to pending actions, its effective date is April 24, 1989.

The

standing rule of statutory construction, as codified, is that

1

In Utah, courts have equitable power to award attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense was without merit and not asserted in good
faith. Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56 (1990); Cadv v. Johnson, 671
P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). Hercules' conduct in this case would not
warrant assessing Wagner's attorneys' fees against Hercules.
-2-

w

[n]o

part

of

these

revised

expressly so declared."

statutes

is

retroactive,

unless

Jtd. S 68-3-3 (1990) (emphasis added).

Retroactive application of statutory enactments is disfavored because it is unfair to the parties.

"The general rule

is that the law establishing substantive rights and liabilities
when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently
statute, governs

the resolution of the dispute."

Industrial Comm'n,
implies

that

725 P.2d

1335, 1336

litigants should

be able

Carlucci v.

(Utah 1986).
to order

enacted

Fairness

their

conduct

according to the law in effect at the time litigation decisions
are made, especially when the controlling law is statutory.

For

this

the

reason, Utah

courts have

recognized

that

"ordinarily

facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the
date of the filing of the original complaint."

Archer v. Utah

State Land Bd.. 15 Utah 2d 321, 324, 392 P.23 622, 624 (1964).
The courts have recognized certain exceptions
rule against applying a statute retroactively.

to the

The exception to

the rule of nonretroactivity most significant in this dispute is
that

intervening

amendments

which

are

remedial

or

procedural

only, and which do not enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested or
contractual
actions.
455

(Utah

rights,

may

be

applied

retroactively

to

pending

Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450,
1983).

It

appears

that

no

Utah

court

has

ever

addressed the issue of whether an amendment authorizing an award
of attorneys' fees fits within the remedial/procedural exception.
In the

absence of Utah case

law directly

on point,

there are two sources to guide the Court in determining whether
-3-

an amendment authorizing an award of attorneys1 fees is remedial
or procedural.
roactively.
other

Both recommend against applying S 14-2-2(3) ret-

The first source is Utah cases addressing whether

kinds of

amendments

remedial or procedural.

(not

involving

attorneys'

fees) are

The second is cases from other jurisdic-

tions directly addressing the issue of whether statutory amendments authorizing attorneys' fees are substantive or procedural.
In Carlucci. supra, the court addressed the

issue of

whether the statute creating the Default Indemnity Fund was substantive or merely remedial and procedural.
to pay workers

or their dependents

their employers are unable to pay.
statute

creating

the Fund

was

The Fund was created

compensation

benefits when

The plaintiff argued that the

remedial

and

that

it

therefore

could be applied retroactively to cover the death of her husband,
who had died

five months before the statute's effective date.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the statute was substantive and
therefore could not be applied retroactively.
mined

that

The court deter-

the statute was substantive because

it created new

rights and liabilities. Carlucci, 725 P.2d at 1337.
The attorneys' fees provision in S 14-2-2 is like the
statute in Carlucci in that it also creates new rights (for prevailing parties) and new liabilities (for losing parties).
similarity

between

the

statutes

indicates

that

the

This

amendment

authorizing attorneys' fees is substantive in nature, and should
not be applied retroactively.
In Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Servs., supra, the issue
was whether a statute enacted in 1975, authorizing the State to
-4-

recover past due child support payments, could be applied retroactively to the payments owed under a 1965 divorce decree.

The

Utah Supreme Court stated that although retroactive application
of statutes

is disfavored,

procedural statutes."

"an exception

is made for remedial

Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 455.

The court con-

cluded that the statutory provisions at issue were remedial and
procedural because they provided a means for enforcing existing
child support payments, creating no new obligations, and destroying no vested interests.

663 P.2d at 455-56.

By contrast, requiring Hercules to pay Wagner's attorneys1

fees pursuant to S 14-2-2(3) would impose a new obligation

which did not exist before the amendment.
not

possess

the

characteristics

of

a

Thus, S 14-2-2(3) does
remedial

or

procedural

amendment, and should not be applied retroactively.
The second source of guidance for determining whether
an amendment authorizing an award of attorneys' fees is remedial
or procedural is the body of case law from neighboring jurisdictions addressing

the

issue.

The jurisdictions are split over

this issue, but the majority of Utah's neighboring states which
have addressed the issue have held that amendments authorizing
attorneys' fees are substantive, and thus courts refuse to apply
them retroactively.

However, it is the reasoning of the cases,

not the number of them, which is most persuasive.
The Arizona courts have addressed the issue of whether
statutes authorizing attorneys' fees are substantive in the context of deciding whether retroactive application is appropriate.
Wagner cites Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal. 118 Ariz. 63, 574 P.2d
-5-

856 (Ct. App. 1977), but Hercules believes that a more informative case is Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz, 77, 607 P.2d 954 (1979),
decided by the Arizona Supreme Court one year after the Arizona
Court of Appeals' decision in Circle K.
In Bouldin, the issue was whether a statute providing
for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a contract dispute applies retroactively to suits commenced before the
effective date of the statute.

Like Utah, Arizona recognizes the

exception for remedial or procedural statutes.

607 P.2d at 955.

The court specifically examined the attorneys' fees provision and
held that "such a provision is substantive and not procedural."
Id.

Most importantly, the court explained why a statute awarding

attorneys' fees is substantive:
of damages.

Id.;

because it changes the measure

see also, Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,

160 Ariz. 144, 771 P.2d 469 (App. Ct. 1989) (statute awarding
attorneys' fees is not procedural and may not be applied retroactively to pending libel cases); USLife Title Co. v. Soule Steel
Co., 122 Ariz. 79, 593 P.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1979) (statute granting
discretion to award attorneys' fees in contract actions is substantive and may not be applied retroactively).
The Oregon courts have also addressed the issue of
retroactivity

of

a

statute

awarding

attorneys'

fees.

In

Zaik/Miller v. Hedrick, 72 Or.App. 20, 695 P.2d 88 (1985), a
statute awarding

attorneys' fees took effect while the trial

court proceeding was pending.

Plaintiffs argued that the statute

was remedial or procedural rather than substantive but the court
held that the attorneys' fees provisions were substantive, and
-6-

refused to apply the statute retroactively.

The court explained

that because attorneys' fees "are not merely costs incidental to
judicial administration,

awarding them is a matter of substan-

tive, rather than procedural, right."

Zaik/Millerf

695 P.2d at

89 (quoting Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Schriber, 51 Or.App. 441,
448, 625 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1981)).

See also, Bahr v., Ettinqer,

88 Or.App. 419, 745 P.2d 807 (1987) (statute authorizing attorneys' fees against party who acted in bad faith is substantive
and may not be applied retroactively).
Courts in Colorado and Nevada have also held that statutes authorizing attorneys' fees may not be applied retroactively
to

actions

pending

on

the

statute's

effective

date.

See

Allchurch v. Project Unicorn, Ltd., 516 P.2d 441 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973)(statute authorizing recovery of attorneys' fees in unearned
wage claim may not be applied retroactively); American Fed, of
Musicians v. Reno's Riverside Hotel, Inc., 475 P.2d
1970)(striking

an award of attorneys' fees pursuant

220

(Nev.

to statute

amended after the commencement of the law suit).
Furthermore,

the present

from the cases cited by Wagner.

action can be distinguished
In Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho

565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978), the statute allowing attorneys' fees
was in effect before the cause of action was tried.

In Eriksen

v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App.
1989), the statute allowing attorneys' fees was in effect before
the

lawsuit

was

even

filed.

However,

the

situation

in

the

present case is significantly different from Jensen and Ericksen
in

that

S 14-2-2(3) became

effective

-7-

after

the

law suit

was

tried.

Applying S 14-2-2(3) retroactively would work a greater

unfairness to Hercules because, compared to Jensen and Erjjcsen,
the amendment

in this action became effective at a significantly
o

later stage of the litigation.
The present action can also be distinguished from Camer
v. Seattle School Dist. No, 1, 52 Wash.App. 531, 762 P.2d
(1988).

356

In Camer, the court awarded attorneys' fees because it

found the plaintiff's claims to be frivolous.
By contrast,

there

762 P.2d at 361.

is no evidence or allegation

that Hercules

made frivolous defenses.
In sum, S 14-2-2(3) is substantive because it changes
the measure of damages, it creates new rights and liabilities,
and the attorneys' fees are not incidental to judicial administration.

The

amendment

should,

therefore,

not

be

applied

retroactively.
In addition to the remedial/procedural exception, the
courts have recognized certain other exceptions to the rule of
nonretroactivity.

One such exception exception exists for pri-

vate attorney general statutes.

Wagner cites cases upholding the

retroactivity of private attorney general statutes, such as the
Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, as though these cases
add support to the claim that the remedial/procedural exception
should apply.
for Rehearing

See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Petition
at

10-11.

These cases do not

2

support

Wagner's

In the trial court proceedings, where Hercules was the prevailing party, Wagner correctly argued that S 14-2-2 could not be
applied retroactively to this action. The trial court appropriately ruled that the amendment does not apply retroactively.

-8-

argument because the objective of the private attorney general
doctrine

is to encourage public policy

broad class of citizens.

suits which benefit

a

Woodland Hills v. City Council of Los

Angeles, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200, 208 (1979).

By con-

trast, S 14-2-2(3) is a section in a chapter of the code entitled
"Private

Contracts,"

and

deals

solely

with

private

contracts

between owners and contractors.
There
amendments

is also an exception

intended

to the general

to clarify or amplify existing

rule for

law.

See,

e.g.. Deot. of Social Servs. v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982).
However, S 14-2-2(3) does not fit within that exception because,
rather than merely clarifying or amplifying an existing statute,
the amendment adds an entirely new dimension to it.
Thus, S 14-2-2(3) does not fit within any recognized
exception to the general rule against retroactivity, and should
not be retroactively applied in this action.
COHCLUSION
In Utah, the general rule is that the law creating substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises,
rather than a subsequent amendment thereto, governs the resolution of the dispute.

An amendment authorizing an award of attor-

neys' fees changes the measure of damages, thereby altering the
rights and liabilities of the parties, and thus is a substantive

-9-

change.

Substantive amendments are not given retroactive effect

to pending litigation because to do so would be unfair.

More-

over, awarding attorneys' fees in this action would not be appropriate because Hercules' defense was made in good faith, and was
neither frivolous nor oppressive.
For the reasons stated herein, Hercules requests the
Court to deny Wagner's request for attorneys' fees.
DATED this

day of November, 1990.

z£G

JAMES M. ELEGANTE
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant Hercules
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